Abstract-We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) expected to route packets for other nodes in the network. Such problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We networks find varied applications in real-life environments design a Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) protocol such as communication in battle fields, communication among to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy res prsond incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. networks VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the The conventional protocols for routing, multicasting, and network is required to be bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is broadcasting in ad hoc wireless networks assume that nodes not budget balanced. Ourproposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these follow the prescribed protocol without any deviation and they difficulties. We [16]. Applications at the transport layer and above also exist, themselves for communication. Hence, each node in the although less pervasive in the literature. network, apart from being a source or destination, is also A question of interest in all the above mentioned cases is 1-4244-0614-5/07/$20.00 ©2007 IEEE.
dAVCG AVickrey-C'larke-Groves (mechanism) its own payoff measured in some utility scale. A wireless dAGVA d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet and Arrow node is intelligent in the sense that it takes into account its (mechanism) knowledge or expectation of behavior of other nodes. It is SCF Social Choice Function capable of doing the required computations. The behavior IR Individual Rationality exhibited by a network of such nodes can be modeled in a IIR Interim Individual Rationality natural way using game theory [ 1] which is a popular tool for LCP Least Cost Path modeling cooperation and conflict among multiple interacting BIC-B Bayesian Incentive Compatible -Broadcast decision-making agents. Note that selfishness or self-interest SRBT Source Rooted Broadcast Tree is an important implication of rationality. For this reason, we ICB that of how to provide the appropriate incentives to get around sum of charges collected from the nodes. This implies that the selfish behavior of the nodes. Selfishness is generally the mechanism based protocol is self-started and self-sustained detrimental to overall network performance. Examples of by the nodes in the network. So, we can conclude from the selfish nodes include: a node increasing its power without limitation (L2) that an external entity is required to inject some regard for interference it may cause on its neighbors; a node amount of money into the system to start and sustain the DSICimmediately retransmitting a frame in the case of a collision B protocol. without waiting for the back-off phrase; a node refusing to These two difficulties limit the applicability of a VCG forward the transit packets of the other nodes in the network, broadcast protocol in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish etc. In particular, we focus on the packet forwarding strategies nodes. This motivates the design of a BIC-B protocol to solve of selfish nodes in the specific context of broadcast in this the ICB problem that overcomes the above two limitations.
paper.
Broadcast is useful in ad hoc wireless networks for route B Contributions of the Paper discovery, paging a particular host, or sending an alarm signal,
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a and in very many applications. Successful broadcast requires Bayesian incentive compatible protocol for ad hoc wireless appropriate forwarding of the packet(s) by individual wireless networks is being explored. In particular, we design a Bayesian nodes. It is interesting to study broadcast in the presence of incentive compatible broadcast protocol. The following are the selfish nodes in ad hoc wireless networks. We recall that each contributions of this paper. selfish node incurs a cost when it forwards a packet. Reim-1) We propose a Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast bursing the forwarding costs incurred by the nodes is a way (BIC-B) protocol to solve the ICB problem in ad hoc to make them forward the packets. For this, we need to know wireless networks with the selfish nodes.
the exact transit costs of the nodes. Broadcast protocols that 2) We show that our solution approach effectively tackles induce truth revelation by the individual wireless nodes can the two limitations (Li) and (L2) mentioned in the be called incentive compatible, following mechanism design previous section.
terminology. We can design an incentive compatible broadcast 3) We prove the optimality of the incentive scheme used protocol using embedding appropriate incentive schemes into in BIC-B protocol. We also prove a few key properties the broadcast protocol. We shall refer to the problem of of the BIC-B protocol.
designing such robust broadcast protocols as the incentive 4) We compare and contrast the properties and performance compatible broadcast (ICB) problem [14] . In this paper we of the BIC-B protocol and DSIC-B protocol and provide address the ICB problem in ad hoc wireless networks and effective guidelines for their use.
offer two elegant solutions using mechanism design theory.
C. Outline of the Paper A. Motivation
We organize this paper in the following way. We review the In this paper, we design a Bayesian incentive compatible related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we explain the network broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to solve the ICB problem in ad model and the problem that we are addressing. We propose hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We now motivate the BIC-B protocol in Section 4. We prove a few important the importance of our work.
properties of the BIC-B protocol in Section 5. In Section 6, VCG mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive com-we give examples to illustrate the proposed scheme. We then patible (DSIC) mechanisms [6] . DSIC schemes for unicast, present the simulation results in Section 7. In Section 8, we multicast, and broadcast protocols [1] , [3] , [14] , [17] have been present a discussion on a VCG broadcast protocol and the BICproposed in the literature. We call a protocol VCG protocol, B protocol. We conclude the paper in Section 9 by presenting if the protocol uses The limitation (Li) implies that dominant strategy incentive wireless networks with selfish nodes. We cannot adopt these compatible mechanism based protocols work only for net-solution approaches to the incentive compatible broadcast works where the underlying graph of that network is bi-problem since each node is an intended receipt of the packet(s)
connected. This means that there cannot exist any cut vertex in in broadcast. Note that the intermediate nodes on the unicast the underlying graph. As the number of nodes in the network path are not the intended receipts of the packet(s). increases, sustaining this condition is difficult.
In Wang and Li [16] , the authors propose VCG multicast We say that a mechanism is budget balanced if the sum protocols for ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. of incentives and transit costs of the nodes is equal to the Wang and Li [16] assumed that the nodes in the multicast set forward the packets for free among themselves. In this nodes and we assume that the source node s is the root of paper, we do not make any such assumptions. That is, each the tree. We call such tree as Source Rooted Broadcast Tree node incurs a cost for forwarding a packet.
(SRBT). In this paper, based on the given SRBT, we design Suri [14] proposed an incentive mechanism, Immediate an appropriate protocol for the ICB problem. In designing our Predecessor Node Pricing Mechanism (IPNPM), to stimulate solution, we use the tools and techniques from game theory cooperation among the selfish nodes for broadcast in ad hoc and mechanism design [11] , [10], [5] . wireless networks. According to IPNPM, a node pays only to IV. BIC-B PROTOCOL its immediate predecessor node in the broadcast tree that spans all the nodes. The reason is that all the nodes in the broadcast BIC-B protocol is a broadcast protocol with a Bayesian tree are intended recipients of the broadcast packet(s).
incentive compatible scheme built into it. In this section, In the literature, the dominant strategy incentive compatibil-we study how to design such an incentive mechanism ity is popularly used to design incentive schemes for unicast, that implements the social choice function (SCF) f(0) = multicast, and broadcast protocols in ad hoc wireless networks (k(0), ti (0),... , tn (0)), VO e 9, where 9 is the set of all with selfish nodes. All the models that we discussed in this cost profiles, corresponding to the ICB problem. Here k(O), section suffer from the limitations similar to (LI) and (L2) and ti (0), Vi C N are interpreted in the following way. k(0) is mentioned above. In this paper, we propose the BIC-B protocol the allocation rule that represents which nodes in the network for the ICB problem such that it overcomes these limitations. have to forward the packet, given the profile 0 of types and tL(0) is the payment received by the node i, given the profile III. THE MODEL 0 of types. For any i C N, if ti(0) > 0, then the interpretation An ad hoc wireless network, in this paper, is represented by is that i receives some positive amount and if ti(0) < 0, then an undirected graph G = (N, E), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the interpretation is that i pays some positive amount.
the set of n wireless nodes and E is the set of communication Now assume that we are given the SRBT corresponding links between the nodes. There exists a communication link to the graph under consideration, when the cost profile is 0. between two nodes i and j, if a node i is reachable from A. Payment Scheme Based on SRBT node j, and node j is also reachable from node i. Thus we have an undirected graph representation. We assume that each
In the SRBT, all the internal nodes forward the broadcast wireles ndie has r a n on-rection.antenna and that sin packet. We call such packet forwarding nodes as routers, wireless node has an omni-directional antenna and a singleanreestthstofoursbR. neighbor to which the packet is destined. We can represent Oi as the weight of node i in the graph G. This implies that we
To compensate the incurred costs of the routers in the ad work with a node weighted graph. We assume the graph G is hoc wireless network, we need to determine payments to the bi-connected. This assumption guarantees that the graph that nodes We use the payment rule of the dAGVA mechanism or remains after removing any node and its incident links from expected externality mechanism [10] to compute the payments the graph is still connected. Thus, the bi-connectivity of the to the nodes in our scheme. So, Vi E N, VO e 9, we get graph prevents monopoly on the network by the cut vertices.
We relax the bi-connectivity assumption in the second part of 1 v the paper. We also assume that wireless nodes do not collude
with one another to improve their utility. This assumption is a standard one in all economic based approaches.
Consider the task of broadcast in such a setting. Assume that network. As explained above, the nodes that are forwarding where F0 0tR,l#iOl1 iS interpreted as the expected valthe packet(s) incur costs. We need a tree that spans all the uation to no 1e i that wouEd be generated by all the remaining nodes in its absence. We now give an interpretation of this Similarly, we can compute the payments to all the remaining nodes in the graph. Here an important observation is that it is not possible to compute the payments using a VCG broadcast limitation (Li). Assume that we are using a VCG broadcast n protocol. Using this scheme to determine the payment to a X ti (0) 0 node, we need to compute the marginal contribution of the i1 node by removing that node and all the edges incident on it from the corresponding graph G. After the removal of the node So, the payment scheme in section IV-A based on SRBT is and the corresponding edges, we need the remaining graph budget balanced and hence the BIC-B protocol can be self-G to be connected. For this reason, we require the original started This implies that the BIC-B protocol overcomes the graph G of the underlying ad hoc wireless network to be bi-limitation (L2)w connected in order to use a VCG broadcast protocol.
With this, we can conclude that the BIC-B protocol overOn the other hand, if we use the BIC-B protocol, the comes the two limitations (Li) and (L2).
Q.E.D. payment rule is such that it does not require any such condition Lemma 2 The payment rule (3) based on SRBT is Bayesian on the original graph of the underlying network. The following incentive compatible and it is minimum among all Bayesian example illustrates this idea.
incentive compatible payment schemes based on SRBT. Let us consider the graph in Figure 4 , which is not bi-Proof: It is easy to see that the payment rule (3) based on connected. We consider ei),(92,(93, and (94 are the type SRBT is Bayesian incentive compatible since it is derived sets of the nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively in the graph. from the dAGVA mechanism, which is Bayesian incentive Now let us assume that the probability distributions, from compatible. Now we need to show that the payment rule (3) which the players' types are drawn, are uniform and let based on SRBT is minimal among all payment schemes based 0 =(Oi, 02, 03, 04) be the announced cost profile.
on SRBT. We prove this by contradiction. 
(since from equation (6) A. Optimality of the Payment Scheme in BIC-B Protocol yields minimum payment to any node among all the Bayesian Here we prove the optimality of the payment scheme de-incentive compatible payment schemes based on this optimal fined in Section III, which is used in the BIC-B protocol. This SRBT (Q E D.). result is true if we are given an optimal SRBT of the underlying VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES graph of the ad hoc wireless network under consideration. Here the term optimal means that the total cost of the SRBT Here we provide illustrative examples to explain the BICis minimized. Note the following notation that is used in B protocol. Before (ii) corresponding to the graph considered. Let node 1 be then the payment rule (3) based on the given optimal SRBT the source of broadcast. The fundamental difference between is Bayesian incentive compatible and the payments based on this scheme and that of BIC-B protocol is in the payment rule (3) to any node is minimum among all Bayesian incentive only. Their allocation rules are the same. Here, the broadcast compatible payment schemes based on the given optimal packets follow the least cost paths corresponding to the nodes SRBT.
as specified in the SRBT. For example, the least cost path from Proof: The payment rule (3) based on the given optimal SRBT node 1 to node 8 is represented by LCP(O, 1, 8) = (1, 3, 6, 8) .
is Bayesian incentive compatible, since the payment rule (3) is designed based on dAGVA mechanism, which is Bayesian Assume that there is another incentive compatible payment scheme t(.) that is minimum for any node based on optimal 5 5 SRBT. That is, (i)
Note that t, (0) and ti (0) are the payments to node i' using (ti(0) + e), where e is the smallest non-zero positive quantity The value of pL is computed using the VCG pricing rule??
chosen such that (ti(0) + e) > Oi. That is, if the cost profile in the following way. 0 is such that 0 = (Oi, 0-i), then the cost profile 0' is such that 0' = (ti(O) + c, 0-j). Assume that the node i is a leaf in 3 the optimal SRBT under 0. This immediately implies that the P1,6 = (cost of 3 to forward a packet) node i continues to be a leaf in the new optimal SRBT under + (cost of LCP(0, 1, 6) without node 3 in network) 0, since the given SRBT is optimal and hence it minimizes -(cost of LCP(0, 1, 6) with node 3 in network) the cost to forward the packets. Essentially, the optimal SRBT = c + 3c -2c = 2c. based on 0 and the optimal SRBT based on 0 are the same. Now consider the following illustrative examples. Now, using the payment rule (3), we get tii(0) = ti(0) (8) Example 1: Let us consider the graph in Figure 4 , which is not bi-connected. We recall that the types of nodes are their Now the utility of the node i under the cost profile 0 incurred transit costs. We consider the type sets of nodes in by using the payment scheme t(. We can conclude the following from the above two payment Now we compute the payments using the payment rule (3) rules. Using the BIC-B protocol, the highest payment to a of BIC-B protocol.
router is 9.7 and that router is 6. Using the VCG broadcast and the VCG based broadcast protocol are 4.15 and 21.6 An important observation is that it is not possible to respectively. So, it is clear that the payments to the routers compute the payments using a VCG Broadcast Protocol, as are less using the BIC-B protocol. We show the same thing the graph is not bi-connected.
using the simulation experiments with the help of different performance measures in the following section. Example 2: Let us consider the bi-connected graph in VII. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS Figure 5 (i). We consider the type sets of nodes in the following
In this section, we show the efficacy of the proposed BIC-B protocol for the ICB problem. In our simulation experiments, A. Simulation Model Now let us assume that the players belief probability func-
The DSIC-B protocol is based on dominant strategy equitions are uniform and 0 = (3, 7,11, 5,1,13,17,15) is the librium of the underlying game and the BIC-B protocol is announced cost profile.
based on the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. Since every dominant strategy equilibrium is also a 7 7 Bayesian Nash equilibrium, but not vice-versa, we first find a dominant strategy equilibrium of the underlying game and compute the payments to the nodes using the DSIC-B and the BIC-B protocols [14] , [15] . paths to all the nodes from the source node and then construct For this example, the given SRBT is shown in Figure 5 (ii). an SRBT. Using the SRBT, we can decide the set of routers.
Now the allocation rule is, k(0) = (0,1,1,1,1,1, 0, 0). We This fixes the allocation rule. Then we compute payments to note that N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8} and R = {2,3,4,5,6}. the nodes using the payment rule of the appropriate broadcast
The valuation functions of nodes are, protocol. In all our simulation experiments, the results for the performance metrics are averages taken over 100 random
.. We consider two performance metrics. The first metric is Now we compute the payments using the payment rule (3) average payment to routers (APR). This specifies the payment of BIC-B protocol.
on an average to each router for forwarding the transit packets. 7 The graph in Figure 6 shows the comparison of the BIC-B Figure 7 . We note in order to compute the payments.
that the lower curve corresponds to the BIC-B protocol in . Strategic Complexity: In the VCG based broadcast the figure. From the graph, it is easy to see that the worst protocol, selection of the best strategy by a node does not overpayment ratio in the network is higher using the DSICdepend on the other nodes since the equilibrium of the B protocol than BIC-B protocol. WOR conveys the following game is a dominant strategy equilibrium. We note that, significant information. When a node receives a packet from in a dominant strategy equilibrium, any node can choose a router, then clearly the payment made by the receiver node its best strategy irrespective of the behavior of the other to the router is higher than the value of its least cost path, nodes. On the other hand, in the BIC-B protocol, selection since it has to give incentives to the router to make it reveal of the best strategy by a node is dependent on the other the true incurred cost. If we take a ratio of the payment to the nodes. For this, a common prior about the distribution of value of least cost path, from the Figure 7 , this ratio is less node types is required and related computations have to than 2 times over all the nodes using the BIC-B protocol and be carried out. it is higher than 5 times over all the nodes using the DSIC-B
. of the BIC-B protocol. We finally presented a discussion on ' using the BIC-B protocol and VCG broadcast protocols for ad hoc wireless networks.
In this paper, the payments computation is performed in a centralized way, so we would like to study the design of a distributed algorithm for the payments computation. It is also very interesting to pursue the design of Bayesian incentive compatible protocols for the incentive compatible unicast and multicast problems in ad hoc wireless networks.
